

Nehru's India*

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Four and a half years is a long time for a diplomat to serve in India. Four and a half years is a very short time for a Westerner to get to know much about India. India is not only an Asian nation; it is a nation of almost four hundred million inhabitants; it is a sub-continent. Because of its many racial strains, its many regions, languages and customs, it is indeed more comparable to the whole sub-continent of Western Europe than to any one nation state in Western Europe. India's predominant religion, Hinduism, is more remote from the predominant religion of the West than any other of the main religions of the world. India is composed mainly of illiterate, ill-clad, hungry peasants living in mud or straw huts. India is riddled by a social disease, casteism, to which there is nothing comparable in the West. The Indians whom the Westerner, and especially the Western ambassador, gets to know, are almost all members of a small governing class. This class constitutes less than one-quarter of one % of the population, and it is not representative of the mass of the people from whom it is divided by a deep gulf.

It is therefore with hesitation and humility that I submit this valedictory report.

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I have tried not to let recent developments bulk too large in my assessment but this is difficult. This report is written at a period of low ebb in India's fortunes.

The last election (1957) demonstrated the strength of the divisive forces of casteism, communalism and factionalism. The communists have secured a beachhead in Kerala from which they can expand if the Congress Party does not have a virtual rebirth. The failure of Nehru to strengthen his cabinet by getting rid of some of the reactionaries and incompetents and by bringing in new blood, arouses apprehensions that his normal lack of ruthlessness and guile added to his fatigue and increasing years may mean that he will not lead the Congress Party to a rebirth.

*This article is part of a letter written in May, 1957, to the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, when the author was High Commissioner to India.

India is facing an agricultural crisis because of its inability to increase production beyond the level reached three years ago. India is so short of foreign exchange and domestic resources that unless it receives foreign aid scale larger than that which now appears likely, it will have to slow down the rate of its economic progress to a pace which may be politically and socially dangerous. There is also grave danger of inflation which is also politically and socially dangerous. The Indians may not fully realize the dangers to them of all these developments. Indeed, one of the most serious aspects of the present crisis is the complacency of almost all the Indian leaders. They are complacent about Kerala, they are complacent about the failure of their agricultural policy, they are complacent about the dangers of inflation. ...

While complacent about many things, the leaders of the Congress Party are, however, conscious of two difficulties or dangers: one relates to Goa and one to Pakistan. The Congress leaders realize that the people of India are becoming increasingly impatient about the inability of the Government of India to persuade Portugal to cede Goa to India. Many people are demanding that the Government do something. There is, however, nothing that the Government can do other than use force, and India does not intend to use force.

The Congress leaders are also very conscious of the danger to India of the continued arming of Pakistan by the United States. ... To protect themselves they must build up their armed forces. The cost in foreign exchange and domestic resources will exacerbate India's economic and financial crisis. It may make India dependent on Russia for relatively cheap arms delivered quickly and on easy credit. All this the Indians blame on the United States. These developments come at a time when there is a great deal of irritation and resentment against India in circles in the West which are normally friendly to it.

India's Liabilities

Independent India suffers from many handicaps in its efforts to improve the conditions of its people.

India took over from the British regime in 1947 an economy which, if not in decay, was at least stagnant. The Indian peasant in 1947 was no better off than the peasant in 1900. He may have been worse off. Particularly from 1920 on the rapid fall in the death rate was resulting in great increases in population. These were not balanced by comparable increases in production. Independent India took over from the British regime in 1947 a country whose natural geographic and economic unity had been shattered by partition. Partition was accompanied by communal strife,

mass murders, mass migrations. The scars have never healed.

Most of India is for most of the year afflicted by a pitiless tropical sun which induces lassitude even in healthy people, and much more so in people who are ill-fed and are weakened by many endemic diseases.

Over four-fifths of its people are Hindus, and as Hindus they have religious scruples against doing such sensible things as destroying the fifty million useless cattle that eat up the scarce fodder which the remaining two hundred and fifty million farm animals could eat. The Hindus are reluctant to destroy the fifty million or so monkeys that damage their crops. They won't eat everything that is eatable; if they had the food habits of the Chinese peasant, their diet could probably be improved by twenty % with scarcely any effort on their part. There are other traditions which, though not directly linked with Hinduism, have their origins so deep in history that they, too, are difficult to eradicate. Even Gandhi couldn't persuade Indian villagers to latrines and to use the night soil as fertilizer. Instead, Indian villagers defecate on the fields near their villages, thus spreading disease and wasting almost all the potential value of the excrement as fertilizer. The villager in most of India persists in using cow-dung as fuel instead of fertilizer.

Indian society suffers from a persistent and pervasive feudalism. It is reflected in the importance attached to status, in the arrogance of superiors to subordinates, in the servility of many subordinates to their superiors.

Worst of all there is casteism. There are more than five hundred sub-castes in India. A sub-caste is a frozen occupational group. It has become something like a tribe. Most Hindus are citizens of their tribes in a much more real sense than they are citizens of their village, their state or their nation. They are bound by the unwritten laws of their tribe. It is their duty to help their fellow-tribesmen. A loyal orthodox tribesman is inclined to vote for a fellow-tribesman regardless of his party label; to get him a job regardless of his merit; to get him promoted regardless of his merit; to steer contracts to him. What he does for his sub-caste he will do even more for those members of his sub-caste to whom he has special obligations, his family, which can extend to fourth cousins.

In addition to the curse of casteism there is the curse of communalism. The great majority of Indians are Hindus, but there are forty million Muslims in India, nine million Christians, and seven million Sikhs. The Hindu communalist considers the Muslims to be second-class citizens. The Muslim communalist believes that the Muslims should band themselves together in a politico-religious society to protect their religion and customs from the Hindu majority. The Sikhs and Hindus quarrel in the Punjab. The Christians consider they are discriminated against.

In some ways communalism is comparable to sub-casteism in its nature and its

effects. The Muslim community in India is divided into *Sunnis* and *Shias*, and these two sects behave in many ways like Hindu sub-castes. So do the Jains and the Sikhs. The ancient Christian community in South India retains the Hindu caste structure. Elsewhere in India Christians are treated either as if they were a separate sub-caste or as if they were still members of the Hindu sub-caste to which their ancestors belonged, whether it is Brahmins or, as it usually is in the north, untouchables.

But the depth and bitterness of the divisions between many members of the various, different religious communities in India is in general greater than that between sub-castes. Moreover Muslim–Hindu antipathy in India is affected by the antipathy between Pakistan and India. Any strain on the relations between Pakistan and India strains the relations between Indians of the Muslim and the Hindu religions.

Since most Hindu sub-castes are regional, and the religious minorities tend to be concentrated in certain regions, sub-casteism and communalism strengthen the divisive force of regionalism in India, a force already strong because it is based on language and tradition and differences of economic interest. Linguistic regionalism has recently been given institutional form in the linguistic states into which India has been divided. All these states, but two, are unilingual. Each of the unilingual states will have its own official language which will be the language of instruction in the schools and probably in the universities.

Then there is factionalism. It is said that wherever four Indians are gathered together there will be two factions and each faction will intrigue against the other. Villages are often divided into two factions. The provincial (state) Congress parties are divided into factions. Civil servants are likely to be split into factional groups in each department. A faction is something like a political party. Not all members of one sub-caste or one religion or one language group will belong to the same faction, but one faction is likely to be supported by the great majority of the members of certain sub-castes, religious or language groups.

Another thing which retards India's progress and weakens the fabric of its society is corruption. India presumably has the normal kind of political corruption which we used to have in Canada: a contractor, to get a contract, must be on the patronage list, and he must pay the regular tariff on the contract to the party funds; politicians get jobs for party workers; politicians persuade or intimidate civil servants into doing favours for deserving constituents; the complaisant civil servant gets promoted. But Indian corruption is more pervasive than this, mainly because wages and salaries are very low, and the low-paid man needs more money not only for his own needs, but so that he can fulfil his obligations to his family.

Corruption wasn't as bad during the last hundred years of British rule as it is

today. By about 1850, the British had broken with their eighteenth century traditions of corruption. Moreover, British administrators in India were not subjected to the same temptations as the Indian politicians and administrators who succeeded them. The British were not members of a sub-caste to which they owed loyalty. They did not need to raise party funds. They could pay their party workers' with titles from '*Rai Bahadur*' to knighthoods. Presumably they steered government contracts to 'loyal' Indians. Presumably their 'slush funds' for buying newspaper support and so on came out of one of the many 'secret service' appropriations. The British civil servant was much better paid than the Indian civil servant of today. Under the British, bribery, corruption and petty oppression were rife up to the District Magistrate level, but not beyond. Now they have reached higher levels and the higher the level that is reached, the more grasping and oppressive does the man at the bottom get.

Yet it is necessary to keep a sense of proportion. It is easy for an Anglo-American to exaggerate the comparative extent of corruption in India. Maurice Zinkin, who has known India for over twenty years, first as a civil servant and then as a businessman, asserts in his latest book that India is less corrupt than most European countries and that in spite of the nepotism and corruption that does exist, the Indian bureaucracy is the best government service between Paris and Vancouver. And he means going East from Paris to Vancouver across the Eurasian land mass.

Undoubtedly, however, casteism, communalism and corruption weaken the administrative machine and they weaken the machine where it is weakest, in the states. Mediocre men get appointed and promoted. First-class men lose heart. But what is even more important is the effect at the village level. The villager is accustomed to a conventional level of corruption and petty injustice. He must, however, have hoped that independence would bring less corruption and injustice. If for long it continues to bring more, he may withdraw his allegiance from the regime.

Here is an impressive, though by no means complete list of the forces in India which are divisive, corrosive or retrogressive. There are others: unemployment, particularly white collar unemployment, under-employment, a propensity to resort to violence, police brutality, the importance attached to leisure rather than to other goods, a business ethic inherited from petty trading rather than from an instinct of good workmanship, a distaste for permitting the inefficient competitor to be driven to the wall, a failure to appreciate the role of profit in any kind of economy, capitalist, socialist or mixed; an under-rating of the importance of monetary rewards as an incentive.

When at the end of my tour in India I was discussing with Nehru my analysis of India's assets and liabilities, he said I had left out the most important liability,

the doctrine so widely accepted in India of 'live and let live.' This, he indicated, had been a source of strength to India because it had enabled pre-Muslim India to absorb one invading group after another. This doctrine had even after centuries sapped the intolerant, proselytising zeal of the Muslims of India. But it also, Nehru said, meant that India was less homogeneous than it otherwise might have been.

Certainly India would be less subject to divisive forces if all its peoples had over centuries been melted in one pot as most immigrants have been in the United States.

But I think that Nehru may have meant more than this. The Indian doctrine of 'live and let live' can mean not tolerance of differences but indifference to inefficiency, shoddiness, corruption. I said at the time to Nehru that it seemed to me that what India suffered from was a certain lack of the ruthlessness in dealing with the inefficient and the corrupt which is required for rapid economic advance.

I cannot recall since I have been in India any one of the top thousand government servants being dismissed or even severely reprimanded for inefficiency. I can recall only a few instances of civil servants of outstanding ability being promoted over the heads of their seniors. I cannot recall that any one of the top ten thousand leaders of the Congress Party has been sent to jail for corruption, and even loyal supporters of the Congress Party must believe that several hundreds of the top ten thousand deserve stiff prison sentences.

India's Assets

Against this, what is there to put in balance? What are the forces within India which can hold India together and which can force a united India forward up the steep mountain path of economic and social progress?

India is geographically a natural political unit, a subcontinent cut off from the rest of the great Afro-Asian land mass by three oceans and by the wall of the Himalayas. There is no other great nation which has such distinct and clearly defined natural borders. Most of the people in most of the sub-continent have during most of the past two or three thousand years felt that they belonged to a common culture or society in something the same way as in the Middle Ages people in Europe felt they were part of Western Christendom. Hinduism has held the people of the sub-continent together in spite of invasions, casteism, civil wars and anarchy.

Before the British came, India had never been united under one sovereignty. The British brought the whole of the sub-continent under their sovereignty or suzerainty, except for a few small French and Portuguese enclaves. They bound the sub-continent together with railways, canals and roads, a national civil service

and a homogeneous upper class. The civil service consisted of administrators, judges, engineers, medical men, army. These were 'all India' services, that is to say, national institutions, not regional or provincial. The Indians in these services were the core of the new upper class the British created. This upper class consisted of Indians from all over India who were homogeneous because they had all been subject to a similar conditioning process. By their education, their training, their 'whipping into shape' by their British colleagues, their culture became a synthesis of Indian and Western culture. Thus the British bequeathed to India a relatively homogeneous governing class of political leaders, civil servants, judges, military officers, engineers, doctors, newspapermen, writers and businessmen.

The British also bequeathed to India parliamentary institutions and a federal constitution. (The Indian constitution is essentially the India Act of 1935). The reaction against British rule brought into existence the Congress Party, a national organization which extended across the whole of India, with the exception of some princely states where its activities were prohibited. The Congress Party was not the kind of revolutionary party thrown up in other colonial territories which consisted of leaders without disciplined mass support. Nor was it something thrown up only in the last years of colonial rule. It was the dominant political party for thirty years before Independence. It organized mass support in the villages. It was taught discipline by Gandhi. It threw up leaders of the stature of the two Nehrus — father and son — and Sardar Patel.

Thus the political leaders of independent India are, in Nehru's phrase, 'children of the revolution.' They have mass support in the country not because of the offices they hold in government, but because they are children of the revolution.

The party they lead is the kind of party which has been able, after independence, to fulfil the purpose of a national political party in a vast, heterogeneous country — to be a broker between conflicting interests — regional, communal, caste and class interests. It is this party which has made the constitution and the parliamentary machines work reasonably well. How different the picture would have been if almost all the legislatures had not been dominated by one national party with an oligarchical structure and, at the top of the pyramid, an all-India High Command dominated by Nehru.

In listing today, ten years after Independence, the items on the debit and credit sides of the balance sheet of India, Nehru must be put down as one of India's most important assets. He is by no means perfect and his weaknesses will probably get worse as he gets older. He has many faults. But what India is fortunate enough to possess is a national political leader of genius, and even a tired and ageing leader of genius is better than a vigorous, young mediocrity who is a leader of a faction or a

party but not of the nation.

These are some of India's assets: geographic unity; an ancient cultural unity; a physical framework of railways, roads and canals; a national civil service; a relatively homogeneous governing class; parliamentary institutions; a strong national political party; a national leader of genius.

India has other assets. The ordinary Indian displays shrewd common sense in most matters not affected by his religious scruples. He has no objection, for example, to contraception. If, therefore, some effective method of contraception can be developed within the next ten years which is suited to an overcrowded, illiterate, poverty-stricken peasant community, the Indian population can probably be stabilized at a level of about five hundred million. Then there is the patience of the peasant, his dignity and his gaiety, his knowledge — sometimes profound — of a rich mythology and folklore which incorporates much concrete wisdom amid much dross and which stimulates and peoples his imagination. and can give him comfort and serenity.

Economic Progress in India

How important to the continued existence of India as a united, independent nation is it for India to achieve and maintain a relatively rapid pace of economic progress?

The orthodox argument is that India is faced with a revolutionary movement of rising expectations and that stable democratic government cannot long survive if these revolutionary demands are not met. The demands are, it is said, in part the result of the promises made by the Congress Party when it was in opposition to the British. These promises went further than the ordinary promises of ordinary opposition parties because the governing party was foreign, because the opposition party had never been subjected to the moderating influence of holding power at the national capital, and because the opposition party was revolutionary, and a revolutionary party is apt to use revolutionary language.

A minority view is that the peasant has for centuries been submissive to misery and injustice and that he is still submissive. There is, therefore, no pressing political need to raise his standard of living, though it is probably politically essential to do something for the unemployed or underemployed or badly paid educated middle class.

My own guess is that though the mass of the hundred and ten million working peasants is still resigned or apathetic, the leaven of discontent is working rapidly, and that if within five or ten years their lot is not improved, the bulk of the peasants

will withdraw their allegiance from the regime. In one way, satisfying the peasant will be easy. Oblivious to the competition between India and China which the world sees, the peasant will be content if every year he knows that he is a little less hungry, that officials are a little less corrupt and the police a little less brutal.

Satisfying the middle class intellectual is going to be more difficult. Like the peasant, he will have to have more material security. But he will also need to know that his society values him; and he in turn must see sufficient virtues in his society to reject the quick and brutal solutions which China offers to India.

Failure to satisfy these two groups will be dangerous, particularly if, as it probably would, a withdrawal of the peasant's allegiance from the regime were to coincide with mounting discontent among the unemployed or poorly employed white collar workers, especially university graduates. These could provide the leaders. The unemployed or underemployed urban workers living in the slums of the big cities could provide the mobs. Indian mobs resort easily to violence. Indian police resort easily to beatings and firings. The Indian people, the last election showed, are becoming increasingly revolted by police firings.

If hopes of reasonably rapid economic progress are frustrated, and even more so if there are economic setbacks, all the divisive and corrosive forces in Indian society are strengthened. If, on the other hand, the mass of the Indian people come to believe that their economic and social condition has improved and is likely to continue to improve, they will have more confidence in themselves and in their leaders and in their country, and the more confidence they have, the easier it will be for them to withstand the divisive forces of regionalism, language, religion and caste and the corrosive forces of under-employment, unemployment, sickness, hunger and hopelessness.

Substantial economic progress in India may be a political necessity. Is it, however, a possibility?

The population of India is now about 390 million. During the next fifteen years it is likely to go up by five million every year. Average income per person is about 285 rupees a year. In real terms this is probably the equivalent of about \$100 in Canada. The total value of the goods and services produced in India every year is about two-thirds of the total value of the goods and services produced in Canada, and Canada has only one-twenty-fourth the population of India. There are over ten million unemployed employables in India. About one-fifth of the urban force is either unemployed or is working for less than 25% of the regular working time. The problem of the so-called 'educated unemployed' is particularly serious. Moreover, every year the potential labour force goes up by two million. Even if the Second Five Year Plan could be completed in five years, it would not hold the line on unemployment. There

would still be over ten million unemployed at the end of the plan period.¹

And the Second Five Year Plan is not going to be completed in five years. Because it is too large in relation to the personnel and organization required to carry it out, it would take six years to complete even if there were shortage of foreign exchange. It will take seven or eight years if India does not get enough gifts, credits or loans from abroad.

But though the task is heavy and the possible pace of progress at least in the next five years is slow, progress has been made in the six years since the commencement of the First Five Year Plan period on 1 April 1951. There are signs of progress which are not susceptible to measurement, such as the success of many community projects in bringing new life into many villages as well as in persuading peasants to use more efficient methods of production. There are indices of progress which are reasonably accurate: the general index of agricultural production, the index of industrial production, and the estimates of total national income.

About half the national income is derived directly from agriculture and allied activities, and during the past six years, agricultural production has risen by over 20%. Industrial production has risen by about 40%. National income in real terms has gone up by about 16%, while the population has gone up by only about 8%.

There is, however, one disquieting fact which is masked by these statistics of progress. There has been no increase in agricultural production during the past three years. The curve of rising production has flattened out. The official explanation is that the crop of 1953–54 was miraculously high because of especially favourable weather and that it has been a considerable achievement to have been able to maintain pretty much that level of production in spite of weather that has been either average or a little below average. This explanation sounded convincing a year ago. It is less convincing today. Next year if there is no substantial increase in agricultural production it will not sound convincing at all.²

But if in the next two or three years a steady upward march of agricultural production is resumed, and at the same time industrial production continues to increase at

¹After 1957 revisions were made in the statistical series from which data in this and the following paragraphs was derived. For example, the more recent estimates indicate that the Indian population in 1957 was just over 400 million, not 390 million, that the annual growth of population in subsequent years has been close to ten million, not five million, and that agricultural production rose 30%, industrial production 42%, national income in real terms 24% and population nearly 12% in the six years from 1951 to 1957.

²Agricultural production in 1956–57 did increase sharply to an index number of 124.3 from the more or less static position of the previous three years (114.3, 117.0 and 116.8). However, farm production again dropped to 115.9 in 1957–58 before rising to a new plateau (well over 130) in subsequent years.

a rapid rate, it will be reasonable to conclude that independent India has been able to reverse a fifty year trend of economic stagnation and decay. Grave doubt will be cast on the validity of the thesis that since independence India has been coasting along on the momentum given it by the British and using the efficient administrative machine built for it by the British. This argument is summed up in the description of Nehru as the last British Viceroy. It is contended that when the British-inspired momentum runs down, when the administrative machine deteriorates, and when Nehru passes off the scene, India will sink back into the rut of its lumbering bullock-carts.

While a longer trend than that of the last six years would be required to disprove this thesis, the economic trends of the past six years certainly throw considerable doubt on it in spite of the disquieting failure to increase agricultural production during the past three years. This doubt is strengthened if the economic trends of the past six years are read along with other developments, in particular the successful holding of two general elections, the completion of the reorganization of the states, and the maintenance of stable governments at the Centre and in most states.

Compared with all the other countries in Asia between Turkey and Japan which are of any size and are not in the Russo-Chinese bloc, India's liabilities are small, its assets large, and its political stability and its economic and social progress remarkable.

India probably has much the best administrative machine of any of those countries. It has a strong, heterogeneous national party. It has a dominant national leader of genius. It is almost alone among these countries in possessing the great advantage of a broad-based popular national government. Its people work much harder than the indigenous peoples of South-East Asia. India is technically the most advanced country in Asia, next to Japan. The climate for foreign investment in India compares very favourably with that of most other Asian countries. India is already an important industrial power. In another twenty years its steel production may well be twenty million tons a year.

It has a large domestic market and diversified resources, and its labour skills are developing satisfactorily. Outside experts have recently concluded that in the long run India can probably become a major manufacturing country and a supplier of industrial goods and equipment to Asia and Africa; that there seems to be no reason why expansion of agricultural output at an average rate of two to three % a year should not continue for many years, and that proper application of known techniques, in conjunction with the possible expansion of irrigation and the cultivated area, could increase India's agricultural output four or five fold; that for some time India should be able to raise its national income at an average rate of four or five % a year, though eventually, as higher income levels are attained, there may be some decline in this rate; and that such an average annual rate of economic growth

should enable India to keep well abreast of the increase in population which will be somewhat over 1.5% a year in the next five years and might rise above 2% in the following decade.

India may be a bad risk, but it is a better risk than any other country in Asia of any size which is not in the Russo–Chinese bloc. It is good that this is so, for India has more people than all the rest of non-communist Asia combined.

While the prospects for India are bright compared with the prospects of the other Asian countries not in the Russo–Chinese bloc, India's prospects compared with those of China do not appear so bright.

China has great advantages over India. It does not have the pitiless tropical sun of India and its climate is more conducive to hard work. Its people work harder than Indians. The Chinese do not suffer as the Indians do from religious inhibitions about certain foods. They eat anything that is eatable. They are not stopped by religious scruples from killing useless cattle or destructive monkeys. They use night soil as fertilizer. China does not suffer as India does from the divisive forces of casteism or linguistic nationalism. China has a strong central government which can make its writ run in all the regions of China; it is not inhibited by a division of legislative powers with the provinces under which the provinces alone have the right to legislate on such matters as agriculture, forestry and education.

China, moreover, can take the short cuts of totalitarianism, whereas India has to take the winding, democratic path of government by discussion and persuasion.

It is not surprising, therefore, that with every year that passes more and more Indians of the governing classes become more and more concerned with the possibility that their great northern neighbour, China, will soon outstrip them in the race for economic and social betterment. And the implications of that for India, for the other countries of Asia and for the world are enormous.

India's International Relations

The general approach of independent India to foreign policy has on the whole been consistent with the beliefs held in the 'Twenties and 'Thirties by the left-of-centre leaders of the British Labour Party: a willingness to give Russia the benefit of the doubt, to ascribe the least damaging motives to her actions; a suspicion of all attempts to erect a *cordon sanitaire* around Russia; a belief that the surest way to war is an armaments race between competing alliances; a pervasive anti-Americanism.

This is not surprising, since those who frame Indian foreign policy were in a very real sense in the 'Twenties and 'Thirties out-of-town members of the

Cripps–Laski–Bevan section of the British Labour Party. It was the Labour Party which was sympathetic to the cause of Indian independence. It was the Labour Party which was interested in removing the evils of colonialism and racialism. The politically-minded Indian, therefore, naturally gravitated to the British Labour Party if he went to England to study. Whether he was in England or India, he read the *New Statesman* as his bible.

The Indian was, of course, much more conscious of the evils of colonialism and racialism than even the farthest left members of the British Labour Party. Most members of the Indian governing class have a personal bitterness about racial discrimination, a bitterness often rooted in personal humiliations which they have suffered because their skin was not white.

Moreover, educated Indians are conscious that theirs is the only great country of Asia to be conquered outright by the West and to be ruled for generations by Western administrators. As Toynbee has put it: 'India's experience of the West has thus been more painful and more humiliating than China's or Turkey's and much more so than Russia's Japan's.'

Racial discrimination of white against coloured (though not of the less coloured against the more coloured) came to India as a result of the British conquest. British imperialism meant to the Indian racial discrimination. Therefore, to the Indian racial discrimination and colonialism are inextricably intertwined. To the Indian, colonialism does not mean the rule of one country by another country. It means the rule of a coloured country by a white country. It does not mean the rule of Russia over Hungary. It does mean the rule of Britain over Kenya.

Since the Indian leaders are the ex-leaders of a revolution against imperial white rule, they, moreover, have a natural sympathy with leaders of other revolutions against imperial white rule.

They are leaders of a country which suffers from great poverty, illiteracy and disease. They believe that there cannot be stability in India or in the world unless the poverty, illiteracy and disease of two-thirds of the world are relieved.

They believe, therefore, that in leading an international crusade against racialism and colonialism, and in pressing for such international organizations as SUNFED, they are helping to build collective security against war. They argue that it is an extreme simplification of a highly complicated problem to present the problem before the world as communism versus anti-communism. Equally important, or more important, are the demands of colonial peoples for self-government, the demand of coloured races for racial equality, the revolt of two-thirds of mankind against its poverty, its disease and its illiteracy. All these, they say, have created a revolutionary ferment in Asia and Africa. How to deal with this ferment is as important or more

important than how to deal with Communism.

India is the most important country in Asia next Russia and China. Nehru is not only the spokesman and symbol of India; he is the most important statesman in the whole of non-communist Asia. It is not, therefore, surprising if India should interpret a failure by Western countries to consult India on an issue which is important to India and to Asia, as not merely a snub to Nehru but as a snub to India and as demonstrating a failure to recognize the importance of Asian, opinion and the profound changes which have taken place in Asia since the war as a result of a revolutionary ferment born of nationalism and an urge for economic betterment.

Indian Diplomacy

British diplomacy in the days of Gladstone and United States diplomacy in the days of Woodrow Wilson and Kellogg, suffered from the defect of reading lectures and self-righteous sermons to the world, of offering such simple solutions difficult problems as the Bryan arbitration treaties or Kellogg's outlawry of war, of interfering in other people's domestic squabbles, as when Congress in Washington demanded homerule for Ireland, of dissipating one's influence over the policies of other countries by trying to exert influence over too wide a field instead of conserving one's influence for matters directly affecting a major national interest.

By trying to do good in matters not of direct concern to one's own country, but of very direct concern to other countries, one irritates or bores other countries. This is not a prudent thing to do if the countries which one irritates or bores are friendly countries whose support one may oneself need on issues of vital importance.

These defects in diplomacy are the defects of generous youth or of gifted amateurs. They usually give place before long to the middle-aged and bureaucratic virtues of discretion. The application of these virtues to diplomacy means asking on every issue of foreign policy not only what the merits are but also whether the direct national interests of one's country in that particular issue are sufficiently great to warrant one's country doing anything about it; to exhaust the resources of confidential diplomacy before publicly criticizing other countries; to use the language of understatement in criticizing friendly countries; and above all not to attribute to friendly countries motives meaner than one's own.

In the first seven or eight years of independence, Indian diplomacy suffered from the traditional defects of generous youth or gifted amateurs. In the last two years or so, Nehru has offended much less often in these respects. ...

Indian foreign policy and diplomacy, though at times exasperating to its friends,

has a record of solid achievement to its credit. In the first place, it has not divided India, it has united India. In a country afflicted by such strong divisive forces, this in itself is a notable achievement. Secondly, India has helped to ease relations between the West and Peking and to find solutions to problems on the periphery of China—Korea, the coastal islands and Formosa, and Indo—China. In Korea and Indo—China it has borne a heavy burden in helping to implement solutions. Thirdly, India by its insistence on the importance of meeting the demands of colonial and coloured peoples for dignity and for help in combatting their poverty, disease and illiteracy, has helped to restore a sense of balance to the thinking of the West which was so conscious of the dangers of Russian expansionism that it had failed to attach sufficient importance to these other dangers to the peace and welfare of the world. Fourthly, India has exercised a useful, moderating influence on the extreme demands of most other members of the Afro—Asian group on colonial matters and on such questions as Cyprus and Israel.

On the whole, however, Indian foreign policy since independence must be judged to be a failure since India has failed to achieve the most important goal of any realistic Indian foreign policy, the establishment of good relations with Pakistan.

As soon as it was clear that there was going to be partition, the national interests of India required that the primary objective of Indian foreign policy should be the healing of the wounds of partition and the beginning of a period of reconciliation which should eventually lead to even closer relations between India and Pakistan than exist between Canada and the United States. First, for example, a Permanent Joint Board on Defence, an International Joint Commission, special facilities for border-crossing, low trade barriers; then joint organs for consultation on all matters of common concern; ultimately a customs union and a defence alliance.

Indian foreign policy and diplomacy have not been able to make progress in this direction. The responsibility for failure must, of course, be shared by Pakistan, but it is reasonable to place the greater share of the responsibility for failure on India, since India is about five times as important as Pakistan, and it has had, unlike Pakistan, the advantages of a strong, stable, popular national administration under a leader of genius.

The stumbling block to the achievement of good relations between India and Pakistan is Kashmir. In order to hold Kashmir, India has sacrificed an immensely greater national interest, and now Kashmir has been held so long by India that a plebiscite in Kashmir would be contrary to the national interests of both India and Pakistan.

The pro-Pakistan element in Kashmir would in a plebiscite campaign appeal to the Muslims of Kashmir to vote for union with Pakistan on the ground that Islam

was not safe in Hindu-dominated India. The campaign would degenerate into an appeal to religious fanaticism. This would greatly increase communal tension in India between Hindus and Muslims. The Hindus of Kashmir, fearing the results of a plebiscite might begin migrating to India. If the plebiscite resulted in union with Pakistan this movement would be intensified. There would be the usual stories of beatings, killings, raping and looting. This might touch off mass riots, mass murders, mass migrations in India and in East Pakistan there might be a recurrence of what happened in 1947. All the accomplishments of the last ten years would be destroyed.

Trends in Indian Foreign Policy

The Hungarian Rebellion of October, 1956, has persuaded India that the regimes in Eastern Europe (other than in Poland) are based not on popular consent but on Russian arms, and that the only political entity outside Russia and China which has freely chosen communism is the Indian state of Kerala. The way in which Russia suppressed the Hungarian rebellion has taught India that Russia is ready to break all the five principles of *Panch Sheel* if it considers its national interests threatened. India is becoming increasingly apprehensive over the long-run effects on the balance of power in Asia, of the success which Peking appears to be having in building up the material resources of China. The prospect of the enormous strength of a China of 600 million people, industrialized and militarized and totalitarian, terrifies India.

India has been shocked by what it considers to have been an act of open, armed aggression by Great Britain against Egypt in 1956. It has a contempt for the present French Government both because of Suez and because of Algeria. Its opinion of the United States has gone up greatly because of the way in which the United States opposed Great Britain, France and Israel over their attack on Egypt. ...

On some important matters, the differences between India and the West over foreign policy may diminish during the next few years.

The United States, by its dealings with Yugoslavia and Poland, has been learning that the chief danger to the West can more accurately be described as Sino-Russian expansionism than as international communism, and it is possible to get India to agree to the reality of the danger of Sino-Russian expansionism, but not to the danger of international communism. It seems likely that the representatives of Peking will be seated in the United Nations within the next year or two, and that most countries will by then have recognized the Peking Government. The West, under pressure from the United States, seems likely over the next few years, to adopt what Indians would call a more liberal attitude on racialism and on meeting the demands of nationalist

movements in dependent territories. The sooner this comes the better. Algeria is a stumbling block to the improvement of relations between India and the West. So is the failure of the West to condemn unequivocally the actions of the South African Government. ...

The admission to the Commonwealth during the next three or four years of Nigeria, Malaya, and the British West Indies, will make the Commonwealth association much more popular in India. Indeed the Indians may soon begin to comprehend that when seven out of the twelve members of the Commonwealth are coloured, the Commonwealth will have become predominantly coloured, not white, and that if the new Commonwealth has any centre, it will be Delhi, not London.

The Indians may, indeed, discover that the Commonwealth has become so useful a potential instrument of Indian foreign policy that India will be serving its own national interests if it goes out of its way to compromise on controversial issues with the white members of the Commonwealth in order to keep them from seceding from it. ...

Conclusion

What will happen inside India, and in India's relations with the rest of the world, depends on a multitude of factors. Some are within the control of Indians, some within the control of Westerners, some within the control of the Russo-Chinese bloc or the Afro-Asian countries. Some factors, like monsoons in India, and the date of Nehru's death or disability, are incalculable. What I have tried to do is to analyze some of the forces which I have seen working in India, some of the trends which I have deduced. My own feeling is that, on the whole, the omens are auspicious for India and for the West provided that Nehru remains as the effective leader of India for at least another five years and that the West behaves with wisdom and patience.

My relative optimism is bolstered by my memory of how far India has advanced in the last ten years, not only in political and economic matters but in social matters. India inherited from the British both a stagnant economy and a social system that was almost stagnant. In ten years of independence more has been done to eradicate the evils of Indian social life than was done in the previous hundred years under the British regime. Casteism in its social aspects has been greatly weakened. The position of women who have been the despised and rejected of Hinduism has greatly improved. More children are going to school.

India has done all this. It has also achieved political miracles: the welding together of the 500 princely states with the rest of India; the redivision of India into

linguistic provinces; the successful holding of two general elections.

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